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Abstract - Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) is a certification 
scheme introduced in 2007 to ensure that wireless SOHO 
(Small Office, Home Office) and home networks could be 
connected to in a trusted, yet user friendly manner. Recently, 
WPS was shown to have a design and implementation flaw 
which makes the feature highly susceptible to attack. Although 
open-source tools have been written and released, no formal 
testing methodology has been developed. This research 
presents a proposed method for the testing of this 
vulnerability in a measured and systematic way. 
Keywords: Wireless LAN, Computer Security, Data Security 
 
1 Introduction 
 Access to Local Area Networks (LAN) have 
traditionally been restricted to wired connections via coaxial 
cable, CAT 3, 4, 5 or 6 cables, and Unshielded Twisted Pair 
(UTP).  However, in 1997 the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) helped establish the 802.11 set 
of standards by which communications could be facilitated 
wirelessly [1].  Alongside the evolution of these standards 
came an increase in the adoption of this technology in both 
both consumer and enterprise grade wireless communication 
devices. Today, mobility has become a significant component 
of the high consumers demand for electronic devices such as 
mobile phones, notebook computers and tablets. Worldwide 
shipment of Wi-Fi integrated circuits increased 28% between 
2008 and 2009, with wireless integrated circuits in mobile 
handsets alone increasing by 50% in 2009 [2].  Instat predict 
that more than a billion Wi-Fi chipsets will be shipped in 
2012 alone, with Wi-Fi chipsets for mobile phones and 
notebook computers to exceed one billion dollars in 2015 [3]. 
Alongside this surge in usage has come an increased 
awareness of security and its associated issues. In an effort to 
ensure the security of the technology when used in consumer 
devices the Wi-Fi Alliance drafted the Wi-Fi Protected Setup 
(WPS) specification and certification in 2007 [4]. Three 
methods of using WPS were created: 
1. Push Button Configuration Method - A physical or virtual 
button is pushed on both the wireless client that wants to join 
the network, and the wireless router or access point that will 
be the gateway into the network. 
2. Personal Identification Number (Internal Registrar) - The 
PIN of the wireless client that wants to join the network is 
entered into a web interface of the wireless gateway. The PIN 
can be written on the wireless device, or may be generated in 
software. 
3. Personal Identification Number (External Registrar) - The 
PIN of the wireless gateway that allows access to the wireless 
network is entered into an interface of the wireless client. 
The PIN (External Registrar) method of authentication was 
found to be vulnerable to a brute force attack in late 2011 [5]. 
This vulnerability allows for an attacker to gain unauthorized 
access to a wireless network within a matter of minutes to 
days, no matter how strong the Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA) passphrase is. 
2 Background 
2.1 Significance 
 The aim of this research was is produce a rigorous and 
comprehensive methodology and procedure that will allow 
for a wireless device to be tested for its susceptibility to the 
WPS external registrar PIN authentication design 
vulnerability. Currently there is no formal testing 
methodology that may be applied to a wireless device that 
will give a comprehensive and detailed view of its 
susceptibility to the vulnerability.  
Once in place the method will allow for the systemized 
testing and evaluation of wireless consumer devices. To date 
only sporadic data from unnamed sources has been available. 
Whilst such data of an unknown nature claims to prove 
vulnerability for a given device, the methodology used is not 
disclosed or document. Therefore, the method proposed in 
this work may be used to verify such results ensuring both 
consistency and reliability in the gathered data.  
The information obtained by this research may be useful to 
owners of wireless devices as a credible and reliable guide to 
the vulnerability of their devices. It may also be used to 
expose manufacturers that have yet to patch the vulnerability 
in their products. This is of particular concern due to the rise 
of wireless related attacks becoming a feature in modern 
criminal enterprise [6]. 
2.2 WPS & Vulnerability 
 Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) is an optional certification 
from the Wi-Fi Alliance, a non-profit organization that 
promotes the adoption of 802.11 wireless devices. It has 
almost 500 members and has certified well over 9,000 
products. The standard was introduced in 2007, and currently 
has over 2,000 certified devices [7]. The standard purports to  
allow for the setup of wireless devices to be easier for the 
average consumer, providing for wireless access without the 
need for a complex passphrase exchange.  
Although WPS was an optional certification, the more recent 
Wi-Fi Direct certification ( has a mandatory requirement that 
WPS be included in any device that is to be certified [8]. Wi-
Fi Direct is designed to allow devices to talk directly to each 
other, to replace situations where cables are traditionally used. 
This requirement means that any device that bears the Wi-Fi 
Direct logo will have WPS capabilities, and will likely have 
WPS enabled by default.  
However, in 2011 a detailed a flaw in the design and 
implementation of WPS was discovered [5]. The flaw allows 
for the brute force of the WPS PINs used in Wi-Fi Alliance 
certified devices. The approach is based on flaws within  
authentication when using a PIN via an external registrar, and 
the timing of EAP-NACK messages that reduce the 
searchable key space of the attack from 108 to 104+104. This 
keys pace is further reduced as the 8th digit of the PIN is a 
checksum of the previous seven numbers. Thus, the effective 
key space is actually only 104+103. 
Whilst initially claimed that the WPS vulnerability appears to 
be widespread a limited number of devices were included in 
testing [5]. Thus, whilst it is suspected that a significant 
amount of devices would include this vulnerability, it is 
difficult to ascertain from current literature the true scope of 
the problem. As many devices may allow for the disabling of 
the feature it has yet to be conclusively determined if this 
approach represents a true solution to the issue. Therefore the 
method proposed in this work would allow for a true 
quantification of the issue and the subsequent questions that 
arise.  
2.3 Reported Mitigations 
 As mitigation, some claim that WPS is a secure channel 
by which to authenticate wireless devices with active brute 
force protection [9]. Although briefly mentioned, it is stated 
that the registrar will warn a user, and will not automatically 
reuse the PIN if a PIN authentication or communication error 
occur. Whilst it appears that some manufacturers have 
implemented a delay when an incorrect PIN is used, the 
length of this timeout is manufacturer and perhaps device or 
firmware specific.  
Microsoft’s implementation of WPS in their operating 
systems released after Windows XP is Windows Connect 
Now-NET [10]. The feature allows for the same in-band PIN 
authentication scheme that has been found to be vulnerable to 
a brute force attack. Microsoft’s specification is very detailed 
and shows the steps that are taken by both the Enrolee and 
Registrar to authenticate via a PIN. Microsoft note that the 
“AP Setup Locked” attribute may be set at the access point, 
and that “The access point should enter this state if it believes 
a brute force attack is underway against the access point’s 
PIN” [10]. It is further stated, “…the use of the access point’s 
PIN for adding external registrars is disabled in this state” 
[10]. However, the strength of the implementation and the 
extent to which supposedly compliant manufacturers 
implement this timeout, and the duration of the timeout have 
yet to be investigated. Again a standardized approach would 
be integral to any research on this subject.  
As with most known vulnerabilities, a United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 
Vulnerability Note was created when information of the 
vulnerability was disclosed [11].  Such alerts are 
accompanied by a recommendation to disable WPS as a 
workaround, however as mentioned previously, this may not 
guarantee the cessation of the attack vector. A second online 
vulnerability database entry was created with the reference 
CVE-2011-5053 [12][13]. No workarounds or 
recommendations are provided. 
Recently, an effort to crowd source the detection of the 
vulnerability across devices and firmware versions has arisen 
online [14]. The list is fairly comprehensive, with 133 entries 
covering most router and wireless access point vendors. 
However, whilst the information is presented in a coherent 
and uniform way, the accuracy of the data cannot be verified. 
It must be noted that the information does seem to support the 
theory that the WPS PIN vulnerability is widespread.  
Since the discovery of the WPS PIN vulnerability a number 
of open source tools have surfaced that allow for testing and 
exploitation such as Reaver and WPSCrack [15][16]. Thus in 
conjunction with these tools a standardized approach to 
testing the vulnerability would allow both individual and 
systematic audit of all devices giving clear quantification of 
the problem as well as certifiable testing of mitigation 
approaches. It is therefore proposed that once established, the 
methodology described in this research will be utilized to 
audit and report on the security of popular Wi-Fi devices.  
3 Proposed Method 
As wireless devices that are to be audited may either be 
delivered to the customers with any version of publicly (and 
privately) available firmware, it is important that as many 
versions as possible are tested. It is not enough to assume that 
if the vulnerability that is to be tested is patched in one 
version, that all subsequent versions will also not be 
vulnerable. 
Flashing the device to its factory default is an important step, 
as it is in this state that the initial customer will receive it. It 
also negates the chances that, if the device was not purchased 
new, the previous owner changed settings that would affect 
the results of an audit. Testing devices with both WPS 
enabled and disabled will ensure that the device manufacturer 
has not made an error, and that disabling the WPS feature in 
the configuration truly does disable the feature. This is 
important as it is logical for a consumer to assume they are 
not vulnerable if the vulnerable service is not seemingly 
enabled. 
The wash tool was designed to identify wireless devices that 
have WPS enabled. Proving the effectiveness of this tool in 
identifying devices that have WPS enabled may help reduce 
time spent running Reaver against devices that do not have 
WPS enabled [15]. Reaver has been in development for over 
a year, and was publicly released in December 2011. The tool 
is designed to audit wireless devices for the WPS brute force 
vulnerability. Reaver may either fail to probe a device (either 
due to the device not having WPS enabled or having other 
protection mechanisms enabled), succeed but be rate limited 
(due to the device implementing brute force protection 
mechanisms), or succeed with little to no impedance. 
The proposed method is illustrated below. The method 
proposes a systematic approach to the testing of any Wi-Fi 
device allowing for consistency and repeatability. It is 
envisaged that the implementation of this method will 
produce a significant volume of reputable data on the WPS 
vulnerability issue. To this, a study is now underway to verify 
and utilize the approach against a body of commercial 
devices.  
4 Conclusion 
 The WPS external registrar PIN authentication design 
vulnerability is a dangerous security hole for home and 
SOHO users of wireless devices. The public has been lead to 
believe that as long as their WPA/WPA2 passphrase is 
complicated enough, then their networks are safe from 
unauthorized access. Clearly this is no longer the case, but the 
scale of the vulnerability has yet to be fully examined. 
The development of a reliable WPS external registrar PIN 
authentication design vulnerability testing methodology will 
allow for a standardized way to test for weak implementations 
of WPS by device manufacturers. It will allow for current and 
future devices to be tested, with reliable results generated 
from an audit. 
The results found from applying the developed auditing 
methodology to wireless devices will not only allow for the 
detailed examination of data, but will allow members of the 
public to easily and reliably ensure the security of their own 
devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 – The Proposed Testing Methodology 
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